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Waterboarding and the Legacy of the BybeeYoo “Torture and Power” Memorandum:
Reflections from a Temporary Yoo Colleague
and Erstwhile Bush Administration Apologist
M. Katherine B. Darmer*
INTRODUCTION
It is commonly said that we are a nation of laws, not men.
And we are. But beyond the laws, we are also a nation of men
and women with a common ethic. Some things are not
American. Torture, for damned sure, is one of them.1

This essay argues that waterboarding is torture and that
torture is illegal and wrong. It strikes me as unfortunate that
these are really debatable propositions in 2009,2 but we know all
too well that our country has engaged in waterboarding and that
prominent academics and lawyers continue to defend such tactics
today.3
* Professor of Law, Chapman University. I thank all of the current and former
colleagues who provided helpful comments on earlier drafts. I especially thank Deepa
Badrinaryana; Marisa Cianciarulo, Roman Darmer, II; Kurt Eggert, Francine Lipman;
Mark Osler and Lawrence Rosenthal. Thanks are also due to the editors and staff of the
Chapman Law Review.
1 Richard Cohen, A Plunge From the Moral Heights, in CIVIL LIBERTIES VS.
NATIONAL SECURITY IN A POST-9/11 WORLD 317, 319 (M. Katherine B. Darmer, Robert M.
Baird & Stuart E. Rosenbaum, eds., 2004) [hereinafter, “CIVIL LIBERTIES”].
2 More than seventy years ago, a unanimous Supreme Court held that the use of
confessions extracted through torture violated the Due Process Clause. See Brown v.
Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 286 (1936) (describing procedures used as “revolting to the
sense of justice”). For a poignant discussion of the case, see Morgan Cloud, Torture and
Truth, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1211 (1996); see also M.K.B. Darmer, Beyond Bin Laden and
Lindh: Confessions Law in an Age of Terrorism, 12 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 319, 329–
30 (2003).
3 See, e.g., Thomas P. Crooker, Torture, with Apologies, 86 TEX. L. REV. 569 (2008)
(reviewing ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE: SECURITY,
LIBERTY, AND THE COURTS (2007) and RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE
CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY (2006) as books that “eschew the
practice of principle, articulating instead consequentialist apologies on behalf of official
actions ranging from the suppression of dissent to the practice of torture.”);; cf. Alan M.
Dershowitz, Should the Ticking Bomb Terrorist Be Tortured? A Case Study in how a
Democracy Should Make Tragic Choices, in CIVIL LIBERTIES, supra note 1, at 189–214
(advocating availability of “torture warrants” in some situations). For a thorough critique
of the “ticking bomb” scenario, see Alan Clarke, Creating a Torture Culture, 32 SUFFOLK
TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 1, 21–28 (2008) (pointing out that reasoning is “fallacious” and has no
“practical significance”) and David Luban, Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking Bomb, 91
VA. L. REV. 1425, 1444 (“in a world of uncertainty and imperfect knowledge, the ticking-
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When I first read the August 1, 2002 Department of Justice
Memorandum by Jay Bybee and John Yoo regarding torture,4 my
reaction was one that occurs “[t]oo often in the academy.”5 We
“talk in muted voices, hushed, pseudo-intellectual whispers,
unsure whether we should take a stand . . . .”6 Despite my initial
reticence, the memorandum was roundly, almost uniformly
condemned in the academic community.7 While I did join the
choir of condemners, my voice was not among the early,
courageous voices of criticism.8
Perhaps I was over-awed by the credentials of those who
produced the memorandum9 and felt enduring ties of loyalty to a
Justice Department I had only recently left. Perhaps I noted
bomb scenario should not form the point of reference”). Ordinary citizens also seem
willing to condone torture. See id. at 1425–26 (noting that “American abhorrence to
torture . . . appears to have extraordinarily shallow roots” after September 11 and that
support for torture “runs independent of progressive or conservative ideology.”).
Following this article’s submission to Chapman Law Review, new allegations surfaced
regarding the extent to which waterboarding had been used on particular detainees. See
note 53, infra. These allegations and related subjects were topics of a debate on executive
power held at Chapman University on April 21, 2009. John Yoo and John Eastman were
on one side of the debate and Lawrence Rosenthal and I were on the other. See generally
Webcast: Presidential Power Debate (Chapman University School of Law April 21, 2009)
(http://www.chapman.edu/law/webcasts/). Because former Administration memoranda
regarding the details of waterboarding and other interrogation techniques were released
after this article was drafted, those new details are beyond the scope of this article. They
will be addressed in more detail in my forthcoming article, What Can (Should?) Be Done
with Waterboarded Confessions?.
4 Regarding the memo’s authorship, see infra nn.27–32 and accompanying text.
5 Email from Kurt Eggert dated 3/11/09 (on file with author; sent regarding issue
unrelated to torture).
6 Id.
7 See, e.g., Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive Branch,
106 COLUM. L. REV. 1189, 1231 & n.182 (2006) (“In the two years since it was leaked to
the public, the Bybee Memorandum has been withered by criticism for the poor quality of
its legal analysis (citing sources of criticism, including statement by Yale Law School
Dean Harold Hongju Koh that it was “perhaps the most clearly erroneous legal opinion I
have ever read.”));; Jeremy Waldron, Torture and Positive Law: Jurisprudence for the
White House, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1681, 1703–09 (2005) (analyzing memo and concluding
that the quality of legal work reflected therein “is a disgrace”);; Luban, supra note 3, at
1455 (noting “near consensus that the legal analysis in the . . . Memo was bizarre”);; cf.
Erwin Chemerinsky, Civil Liberties and the War on Terror: Seven Years After 9/11
History Repeating: Due Process, Torture and Privacy During the War on Terror, 62 SMU
L. REV. 3, 12 (2009) (calling for investigation and prosecution of Bybee, Yoo and others for
war crimes).
8 As an edited book I was working on regarding civil liberties and national security
went to press (see CIVIL LIBERTIES, supra note 1) the Abu Ghraib scandal came to light, as
did the August 1, 2002 memorandum regarding interrogation techniques, which I
included in the book more than five years ago without “weighing in” as to the memo’s
merits. See id. at 17 (describing Abu Ghraib and development regarding the memo).
9 John Yoo, who has acknowledged an important role in drafting the memorandum,
is a professor of law at Berkeley and former law clerk to the Honorable Clarence Thomas.
He is widely published in leading law reviews. At the time this article was drafted,
Professor Yoo held a distinguished visiting professorship at Chapman University School
of Law. Jay Bybee, the memorandum’s signatory, is now a judge on the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
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that, beyond the memorandum’s authors, there were other
serious lawyers and academics (including at my own
institution)10 who defended the Administration as taking
prudent, defensive measures. Having lived and worked in
Manhattan, I was deeply affected by the tragedy of September
1111 and was reluctant, even within the academy and far
removed from real-world decision making, to be “on record”
opposing any legitimate tactic that might make us safer. I failed
to appreciate that what the Memo was defending were tactics
like waterboarding.12 I was not yet willing to believe that the
Justice Department—in which I had substantial faith—was
actually defending torture. Rather, I noted the Administration’s
disavowal of the Memo, assumed the Memo was not broadly
representative of Administration views, and accepted the
explanation that Abu Ghraib was perpetrated by a “few bad
apples.”13 I was unwilling to accept the notion that the Memo
reflected and sought to justify a “torture culture.” The term
“waterboarding” was not yet in the popular lexicon.
In the immediate aftermath of the attacks, moreover, I was
fully supportive of what appeared to be appropriate law
enforcement responses. I was impressed with President Bush’s
declaration that hate crimes against Muslims would not be
tolerated and by his Administration’s swift move against the
perpetrators of hate crimes. Aggressive use of material witness

10 See David Glenn, ‘Torture Memos’ vs. Academic Freedom, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC.
(Wash., D.C.), March 20, 2009, at A12 (noting that Chapman’s Law School Dean John C.
Eastman is one of Professor Yoo’s “staunchest advocates;;” “After September 11, we were
in unchartered territory, Mr. Eastman says . . . . [A]nd I think John actually got it right
most of the time”).
11 The World Trade Center was for me, like all New York residents, both symbol and
guidepost. I worked in the shadow of the towers, in lower Manhattan, as an Assistant
United States Attorney for four years. In my early days in the office, respected senior
colleagues were prosecuting those responsible for the first attacks on the Towers, which
attacks occurred in 1993. Other colleagues became involved later in the investigation of
the attacks on the U.S.S. Cole. The name Osama bin Laden was familiar to me even
before September 11, and it was the first name that crossed my mind when the terrorists
struck. When the towers collapsed, I felt an acute sense of “survivor’s guilt.” Having left
Manhattan for the comparative safety of Chapman’s academic halls in 1999, I listened
raptly to the tales of former colleagues’ stories of escape from lower Manhattan. I broke
down in a faculty meeting when a cousin’s wife could not at first be located in New York
City on the day of the attacks. A well-respected FBI agent whom I had briefly worked
with died at the Towers. Visiting Manhattan now is disorienting, with the lack of the
landmark as a point of reference a constant reminder of the horror of how it was lost.
12 See CIVIL LIBERTIES, supra note 1, at 303–15 (excerpted copy of the
memorandum).
13 See Luban, supra note 3, at 1452 (noting that “Abu Ghraib is not a few bad
apples—it is the apple tree.”);; see also Statement of Senator Patrick Leahy on Abuse of
Foreign Detainees, Oct. 1, 2004, available at http://leahy.senate.gov/press/200410/
100104C.html (noting that the Bush Administration has maintained that the abuses that
occurred at Abu Ghraib were a result of “a few bad apples”).
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warrants and other temporary detentions14 struck me as
prudent.
As time went on, however, unease set in, and then alarm.
Those of Middle Eastern descent were targeted for questioning.
Detentions at Guantanamo continued, with minimal process for
detainees.15 Even more troubling, it became plain that tactics
such as waterboarding had been used by our country in
interrogating suspects.16 Those who had read the August 1, 2002
Memo with a more jaundiced view than I had were already on
record with dire warnings regarding the Memo’s implications.17
Their concerns were realized.
This short essay, thus, is largely simply an acknowledgment
of the important role played in this debate by voices more forceful
and prescient than my own. Because the August 1, 2002 Memo
and related memoranda have been so thoroughly and effectively
addressed by others,18 I will draw heavily on that work to
address the question whether waterboarding is torture and then
turn to a January 29, 2009 Wall Street Journal op-ed published
by Professor John Yoo on the eve of this symposium.19
Professor Yoo himself has defended waterboarding quite
recently. In his January 29, 2009 op-ed, for example, Yoo decried
the Obama Administration’s decision to terminate the CIA’s
“special authority to interrogate terrorists” and suggested that
“coercive interrogation methods,” including waterboarding, were
appropriately used in the prior Administration.20 In light of this
continued debate, I believe it is important to acknowledge the

14 See Michael Greenberger, Indefinite Material Witness Detention Without Probable
Cause: Thinking Outside the Fourth Amendment 3 (Univ. of Md. Sch. of Law Research
Paper No. 2004-01, 2004), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=494763.
15 See JOHN TEHRANIAN, WHITEWASHED: AMERICA’S INVISIBLE MIDDLE EASTERN
MINORITY 134–35 (2008).
16 See, e.g., Marjorie Cohn, Trading Civil Liberties for Apparent Security is a Bad
Deal, 12 CHAP. L. REV. at 623–24 (detailing abuses, including torture at both
Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib); see also generally Ernesto Hernández-López,
Boumediene v. Bush and Guantanamo, Cuba: Does the “Empire Strike Back”?, 62 SMU L.
REV. 117 (2009) (placing detentions at Guantanamo Bay in historical, post-colonial
context).
17 See W. Bradley Wendel, Legal Ethics and the Separation of Law and Morals, 91
CORNELL L. REV. 67, 75–85, 98–100 & n.110 (2005) (discussing the torture memo
controversy and noting several articles criticizing the memos).
18 See, e.g., Waldron, supra note 7, at 1703–09.
19 I acknowledge the inelegance of a focused piece on waterboarding given the
contemporaneity of Yoo’s brief visitorship at Chapman, but with issues related to
memoranda written by Yoo being addressed almost daily in the press, it is impossible to
ignore them.
20 John Yoo, Obama Made a Rash Decision on Gitmo, WALL ST. J., Jan. 29, 2009, at
A15.
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extensive and thorough extant criticism of Yoo’s role in
developing a “torture culture” during the War on Terror.
This paper is an outgrowth of my Symposium presentation
on a panel entitled Civil Liberties for Civil Rights: Justifying
Wartime Decline of Civil Liberties by a Gain of Civil Rights, a
title that reflects some ambiguity.21 In the context of this
symposium addressing wartime, however, it strikes me that
those who framed this discussion had in mind that we have given
up certain freedoms in order to gain more safety. Indeed, Yoo
himself subscribes to this view, rejecting as “naïve” and “highflying rhetoric” President Obama’s inaugural speech statement
“that we can ‘reject as false the choice between our safety and our
ideals.’”22 This essay subscribes to our new president’s vision,
however, that holding certain ideals as sacrosanct can be done
consistent with making us safer, particularly in the long run.23
While some minor inconveniences such as longer lines at airports
and greater scrutiny of luggage may have made us marginally
safer, the fundamental transgressions of civil liberties that are
the topic of this particular paper have not, I submit, made us
more secure. Instead, they have resulted in a “plunge from the
moral heights”24 with no demonstrable increase in our safety.
Indeed, torture arguably makes us less safe because it makes it

21 In grappling with the title of the symposium panel, I started with my office copy
of Black’s Law Dictionary in an effort to illuminate the understood difference between the
juxtaposed terms. Black’s Law Dictionary formerly defined “civil liberties” as “Personal,
natural rights guaranteed and protected by Constitution . . . .” And for “civil rights,” it
said simply “see Civil liberties.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979). Sometimes I
think we think of “civil liberties” in terms of negative liberties, or freedom from
governmental interference with, e.g., free speech, whereas “civil rights” sometimes
connotes positive rights. “Civil rights” is often also a term associated with the attainment
of right by minority groups. See, e.g., WEBSTERS II NEW RIVERSIDE DICTIONARY (1984)
(defining “civil liberty” as “[f]reedom from governmental infringement of such individual
rights as freedom of speech and action”). Indeed, the more current version of Black’s Law
Dictionary reflects this distinction, with civil liberty defined as “freedom from undue
governmental interference or restraint . . . also termed civil right.” Civil right is then
separately defined as “the individual rights of personal liberty guaranteed by the Bill of
Rights and by the 13th, 14th, 15th, and 19th Amendments, as well as by legislation such as
the Voting Rights Act. Civil Rights Include especially the right to vote, the right of due
process, and the right of equal protection under the law” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 263
(8th ed. 2004).
22 Yoo, supra note 20.
23 I acknowledge concerns that the reality of our new president’s policies regarding
civil liberties may not live up to campaign rhetoric. See Remarks of Nadine Strossen,
Chapman University Dean’s Dialogue Series (March 13, 2009) (available at
http://www.chapman.edu/law/webcasts/); William Glaberson, U.S. Won’t Label Terror
Suspects as ‘Combatants,’ N.Y. TIMES, March 14, 2009, at A1 (noting the current Justice
Department’s argument “that the president has the authority to detain terrorism suspects
[in Guantanamo] without criminal charges . . .”).
24 Richard Cohen, A Plunge from the Moral Heights in CIVIL LIBERTIES, supra note
1, at 317.
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more likely that our own troops will be tortured in return25 and
also inflames anti-American sentiment.
Perhaps more
important, even if waterboarding has made us safer, it is an
abandonment of core principles to engage in it and thus we
should reject it categorically, Yoo’s past and current arguments
notwithstanding.26
I. THE BYBEE-YOO TORTURE AND POWER MEMORANDUM
The August 1, 2002 memorandum, prepared for Alberto R.
Gonzalez, counsel to the President, was prepared by the United
States Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel (“OLC”) and
signed by Jay S. Bybee, then Assistant Attorney General27 and
now a Ninth Circuit judge. John Yoo, a professor of law at
Berkeley who served in the OLC when the memorandum was
prepared, drafted and defended the memo,28 which is sometimes
referred to as the “Yoo Memorandum,” sometimes as the “Bybee
Memorandum,”29
and
sometimes
as
the
“Torture
Memorandum.”30 Because Yoo is widely acknowledged as the

25 See Chemerinsky, supra note 7, at 12 (noting concerns raised by military
personnel and their loved ones that other countries will not follow international law when
dealing with American prisoners).
26 In his dissenting opinion in Olmstead v. United States, Justice Brandeis stated
that “Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the
Government’s purposes are beneficent. Men born to freedom are naturally alert to repel
invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in
insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.” 277
U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). I re-read this passage recently in a context
unrelated to the subject of torture, but it resonated in this context and I note that Nadine
Strossen, in a recent article, referred to Brandeis’s warning in the context of discussing
Yoo and other Bush Administration lawyers. See Nadine Strossen, Freedom and Fear
Post-9/11: Are We Again Fearing Witches and Burning Women?, 31 NOVA L. REV. 279,
287 (2007); see also Cohn, supra note 16, at 623 (also citing to Brandeis’s Olmstead
dissent in the context of the War on Terror). Dean Erwin Chemerinsky has also cited to
Brandeis’s dissent in the context of the War on Terror. See Chemerinsky, supra note 7, at
15.
27 See CIVIL LIBERTIES, supra note 1, at 303–15 (excerpted copy of OLC
memorandum) [hereinafter “BYTAP Memo”].
28 See id. at 321–23; Evan Wallach, Drop by Drop: Forgetting the History of Water
Torture In U.S. Courts, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 468, 469–70 (2007) (noting that Yoo
drafted the memo).
29 Peter Margulies, True Believers at Law:
National Security Agendas, the
Regulation of Lawyers, and the Separation of Powers, 68 MD. L. REV. 1, 36 (noting that
the “Bybee Memo” . . . “was actually authored by John Yoo, and eventually withdrawn by
Jack Goldsmith”) and n.167 (noting that author refers to memo as “Yoo Memo” for
clarity); cf. Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive Branch, 106
COLUM. L. REV. 1189, 1229 & n.179 (2006) (referring to memorandum as the “Bybee
Memorandum” while noting that many have ascribed the writing to Yoo and that the
memo has been described as “Yoo’s most famous piece of advice”);; Waldron, supra note 7,
at 1703–04 (referring to memorandum as the “Bybee Memorandum”);; Luban, supra note
3, at 1454–55 (also referring to the document as the “Bybee Memorandum”).
30 See Glenn, supra note 10, (referring to various Yoo Memoranda as the “Torture
Memos”).
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primary author but Bybee, who was Yoo’s superior, actually
signed the memo and bears ultimate responsibility for its
contents, I believe it more appropriate to refer to the
memorandum as the “Bybee-Yoo Memorandum.” Moreover, the
memorandum is as astonishing for its arrogation of virtually
unlimited executive powers as it is for its narrowly circumscribed
definition of “torture,”31 and so I will refer to the memorandum as
the “Bybee-Yoo Torture and Power Memorandum,” or BYTAP
Memo.32
Two provisions of the BYTAP Memo have come under the
most sustained attack: (1) the narrow definition of “torture,”
which evidence suggests was solicited in order to justify
waterboarding tactics the Administration was already using
when the Memo was written;33 and (2) the claim of unlimited
executive power to engage in any tactic, including torture.34
With regard to the narrow definition, the BYTAP Memo
starts with the statutory prohibition on torture, which forbids the
infliction of “severe physical or mental pain or suffering.”35 The
full definition of “torture” is as follows:
“torture” means an act committed by a person acting under the color
of law specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or
suffering (other than pain or suffering incidental to lawful sanctions)
upon another person within his custody or physical control;
“severe mental pain or suffering” means the prolonged mental harm
caused by or resulting from—
the intentional infliction or threatened infliction of severe physical
pain or suffering;
31 See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Assault on the Constitution: Executive Power and
the War on Terrorism, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 16 (2006).
32 As an aside, there is something unsettling about the degree of opprobrium faced
by Professor Yoo when contrasted with the relative quiet regarding Judge Bybee. I have
read no reports of protests at the Court of Appeals where Judge Bybee sits, whereas Yoo
has been the target of a number of protests (including a very loud one outside the building
where this is being written). I also note that Alberto Gonzalez seems to have faced more
vilification than others equally complicit in the failings at the Justice Department. Is it a
coincidence that Yoo and Gonzalez, who seem to have faced the sharpest criticism, are
Asian and Latino, respectively, whereas Jay Bybee is a white man? I think this is a
troubling question, but one that I will leave aside for now while acknowledging its
existence.
33 MARJORIE COHN, COWBOY REPUBLIC: SIX WAYS THE BUSH GANG HAS DEFIED THE
LAW 36 & n.19 (2007) (noting that memo was written after Attorney General Gonzalez
met with lawyers for the Defense Department and for Vice President Dick Cheney “to
discuss specific interrogation techniques”) (citing Michael Hirsh, John Barry, & Daniel
Klaidman, A Tortured Debate Amid Feuding and Turf Battles, Lawyers in the White
House Discussed Specific Terror-Interrogation Techniques Like “Water- Boarding” and
“Mock Burials,” NEWSWEEK, June 21, 2004, at 50).
34 See Chemerinsky, supra note 31, at 16.
35 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A (2006) (discussed in BYTAP Memo, supra note 12,
at 305).
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the administration or application, or threatened administration or
application, of mind-altering substances or other procedures
calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or the personality;
the threat of imminent death; or
the threat that another person will imminently be subjected to death,
severe physical pain or suffering, or the administration or application
of mind-altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt
profoundly the senses or personality . . . .36

The BYTAP Memo then borrows from language contained in
a statute addressing medical care and concludes that those
statutes suggest that “severe pain” as used in the anti-torture
statute “must rise to a similarly high level—the level that would
ordinarily be associated with a sufficiently serious physical
condition or injury such as death, organ failure, or serious
impairment of bodily functions—in order to constitute torture.”37
But even this narrowed definition would not limit the
President, according to the BYTAP Memo. Rather, “[i]n order to
respect the President’s inherent constitutional authority to
manage a military campaign against al Qaeda and its allies,
Section 2340A must be construed as not applying to
interrogations undertaken pursuant to his Commander in Chief
authority.”38 In other words, despite the constitutional command
that the executive branch execute the laws (including those
categorically forbidding torture), the BYTAP Memo concludes
that, simply by invoking the term “Commander in Chief,” the
president could authorize any interrogation technique, including
torture.39 In short, the BYTAP Memo permitted the conclusion
that waterboarding isn’t torture, but even if it is, the President
can do it. He can do anything.
The BYTAP Memo has been harshly criticized for, among
other things, failing to construe the torture ban in a way that
would avoid conflict with international law, using an unrelated
medical statute in order to reach a narrow definition of “severe
pain,” failing to recognize that the statutory ban on torture does
not admit of exceptions,40 and asserting the view that the
President has a “blank check,” despite the fact that such a
position “is against the great weight of precedent.”41 The BYTAP

18 U.S.C. § 2340.
BYTAP Memo, supra note 12, at 305 (emphasis added).
Id. at 311 (emphasis added).
Dawn E. Johnsen, What’s A President To Do? Interpreting the Constitution in the
Wake of Bush Administration Abuses, 88 B.U. L. REV. 395, 403 (2008); see also
Chemerinsky, supra note 31, at 16.
40 See, e.g., Margulies, supra note 29, at 37–40.
41 Id. at 39.
36
37
38
39
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Memo has also been criticized for starting from the premise that
international and domestic laws wrongly frustrate the ability of
United States officials to act with flexibility,42 while ignoring
long-term consequences of acting unilaterally.43 The BYTAP
Memo is premised on “the epic assertions of executive power
proclaimed by Yoo.”44
The conservative Jack Goldsmith, who succeeded Yoo at
OLC, found that Yoo’s memoranda were not only one-sided but
contrary to law.45 “The idea that Congress could not oversee the
interrogation of detainees . . . ‘has no foundation in prior OLC
opinions, judicial decisions, or in any other source of law.’”46 The
BYTAP Memo does not acknowledge the President’s
constitutional obligation to take care that the laws are “faithfully
executed,” nor does it acknowledge Congress’s delegated powers
to make rules and regulations for the conduct of the armed forces
and for “captures.”47
Dean Harold H. Koh of the Yale Law School has described
the August 1, 2002 BYTAP Memo as “perhaps the most clearly
erroneous legal opinion I have ever read.”48 Yet the BYTAP
Memo has “proved to be enormously influential.”49 Although the
Justice Department formally withdrew the BYTAP memo shortly
after it was leaked, the Administration adhered to many of its
premises even while issuing a new memorandum (the “Levin
Memo”) that embraced the unequivocal rhetoric that “torture is
abhorrent.”50 As Professor Margulies points out, “Levin deserves
substantial credit for clear and resonant language that
accurately represented the consensus on this issue. If one reads
the [Levin] memo more carefully, however, loopholes appear,
justifying what the Administration had already done.”51 One of

Id. at 22.
See id. at 47–48.
Id. at 82.
Glenn, supra note 10, at A12 (citing JACK L. GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR
PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION (2007)).
46 Id. Goldsmith ultimately resigned over concerns regarding the BYTAP Memo.
See Johnsen, supra note 39, at 403.
47 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
48 See Morrison, supra note 7, at n.182.
49 Luban, supra note 3, at 1454.
50 See Margulies, supra note 29, at 40–41 (citing Memorandum from Daniel Levin,
Acting Asst. Att’y Gen., to James B. Comey, Deputy Att’y Gen. (Dec. 30, 2004)).
51 Id. at 41; see also Luban, supra note 3, at 1456 (“Although the Levin Memo
condemns torture and repudiates [the BYTAP Memo’s] narrow definition of ‘severe pain,’
a careful reading shows that it does not broaden it substantially.”);; cf. Chemerinsky,
supra note 31, at 16 (“The significance of the Torture Memo in terms of the Bush
Administration’s views of executive power cannot be overstated.”).
42
43
44
45
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II. WATERBOARDING AND TORTURE
The United States admits to having “waterboarded” suspects
under the auspices of the CIA and continued to claim the
authority to use the technique as recently as 2005.53 The BYTAP
memo’s narrow definition of torture may well have been designed
to allow for this particular procedure.54
Professor Jeremy Waldron’s article, Torture and Positive
Law: Jurisprudence for the White House55 is a powerful
indictment of the BYTAP Memo and other lawyerly efforts to
justify coercive interrogation techniques in the wake of
September 11. Waldron disagrees with the argument that we
should be more sympathetic to the use of torture in
circumstances presented after 9/11.
Rather, “the various
municipal and international law prohibitions on torture are set
up precisely to address the circumstances where torture is likely
to be most tempting. If the prohibitions do no hold fast in these
circumstances, then they are of little use in any circumstance.”56
In his view, the torture prohibition “operates in our law as an
archetype—that is, as a rule which has significance not just in
and of itself, but also as the embodiment of a pervasive
principle.”57
This principle was violated by the use of
waterboarding.
The history of water torture has been thoroughly laid out in
a recent article by Evan Wallach, a judge on the United States
Court of International Trade.58 Judge Wallach traces the use of
the technique throughout history, including by the Japanese
against Allied prisoners of war in World War II, by the United
States during its occupation of the Philippines and in one
instance, domestically, by a sheriff in Texas.59 “In all cases,
See Margulies, supra note 29, at 41.
See Clarke, supra note 3, at 2, 39–40 & n.195 (noting that waterboarding was
used on at least three detainees); see also Cohn, supra note 16, at 624 (noting that United
States has admitted to waterboarding); Margulies, supra note 29, at 41 (noting that
waterboarding was used “at least for three high-level al Qaeda detainees”). New details
have now emerged regarding the extent to which waterboarding was used: 183 times on
one detainee and 83 times on another. See Memorandum from Steven G. Bradbury for
John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, CIA, 37 (May 30, 2005).
54 See COHN, supra note 33, at 36 (describing Newsweek account).
55 Waldron, supra note 7.
56 See id. at 1686.
57 Id. at 1687.
58 Evan Wallach, Drop by Drop: Forgetting the History of Water Torture In U.S.
Courts, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 468 (2007).
59 Id. at 476–77.
52
53
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whether the water treatment was applied by Americans or to
Americans, or simply reviewed by American courts, it has
uniformly been rejected as illegal, often with severely punitive
results for the perpetrators.”60
Judge Wallach recounts the description provided by a United
States aviator subjected to the practice by Japanese captors:
I was put on my back on the floor with my arms and legs stretched
out, one guard holding each limb. The towel was wrapped around my
face and put across my face and water poured on. They poured water
on this towel until I was almost unconscious from strangulation, then
they would let up until I’d get my breath, then they’d start over
again.61

Similarly, in the Texas case, law enforcement officers were
charged with “handcuffing prisoners to chairs, placing towels
over their faces, and pouring water on the cloth until they gave
what the officers considered to be confessions.”62 The sheriff was
convicted and received a ten-year prison sentence; other
defendants also received significant prison sentences.63 At
sentencing, the judge noted that the Texas law enforcement
operation would embarrass even a “dictator.”64
Wallach noted that the “water torture” or “water boarding”
technique has long been prized as an interrogation method
because it imposes “severe mental trauma and physical pain but
no traces of physical trauma that would be discoverable without
an autopsy.”65
During the height of the debate about waterboarding as used
by the United States against terrorist suspects, the journalist
Christopher Hitchens chose to voluntarily undergo the
experience.66 As he describes it: “I was pushed onto a sloping
board and positioned with my head lower than my heart . . . .
Then my legs were lashed together so that the board and I were

60 Id. at 477. For example, one defendant received a ten-year sentence. See id. at
504 & n.159.
61 Id. at 476 (quoting Excerpts from testimony of Cpt. Chase Jay Nielsen, Trial
Record at 55, United States v. Sawada, 5 L. Rep. Trials of War Criminals 1 (1948)).
Nielsen was one of ten U.S. B-25 bombers captured by the Japanese during a raid. The
Japanese tried the men before a Japanese Army Tribunal and executed three of the men.
The U.S. Army later prosecuted the trial’s participants. See id. at n.1 (citing CRAIG
NELSON, THE FIRST HEROES (2002)).
62 Id. at 502.
63 See id. at 504 & n.159.
64 Id. at 504.
65 Id. at 474.
66 Christopher Hitchens, Believe Me, It’s Torture, VANITY FAIR, August 2008
(available at http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2008/08/hitchens200808).
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one single trussed unit.”67 Hitchens was already wearing a hood,
and three layers of “enveloping towel” were applied.68 Then,
In this pregnant darkness, head downward, I waited for a
while until I abruptly felt a slow cascade of water going up my
nose. Determined to resist . . . I held my breath for a while
and then had to exhale and—as you might expect—inhale in
turn. The inhalation brought the damp cloths tight against
my nostrils, as if a huge wet paw had been suddenly and
annihilatingly clamped over my face. Unable to determine
whether I was breathing in or out, and flooded more with
sheer panic than with mere water, I triggered the prearranged signal and felt the unbelievable relief of being pulled
upright and having the soaking and stifling layers pulled off
me.69

After being checked by a paramedic and taking a break,
Hitchens endured a second episode:
I fought down the first, and some of the second, wave of nausea and
terror but soon found that I was an abject prisoner of my gag reflex.
The interrogators would hardly have had time to ask me any
questions and I would quite readily have agreed to supply any
answer.70

Hitchens took strong issue with the “official lie” that
waterboarding “‘simulates’ the feeling of drowning.”71 In his
words, “You feel that you are drowning because you are
drowning—or, rather, being drowned, albeit slowly and under
controlled conditions and at the mercy (or otherwise) of those
who are applying the pressure.”72 Even after the ordeal,
Hitchens has experienced feelings of panic upon awakening or in
circumstances where he is short of breath.73 He concludes that
“if waterboarding does not constitute torture, then there is no
such thing as torture.”74
A majority of Americans share Hitchens’ view that
waterboarding constitutes torture.75
Judge Wallach, too,
concludes that waterboarding is torture even under the narrow
BYTAP Memo definition.76 However, the fact that the BYTAP
Memo seems to have been designed to exclude tactics such as

67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76

Id. at 2.
Id. at 2–3.
Id. at 3.
Id.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 2–3.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 3.
Clarke, supra note 3, at 2 & n.4 (citing results of 2007 CNN poll).
Wallach, supra note 58, at 506.
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waterboarding from the definition of torture illustrates BYTAP’s
biggest problem. Surely waterboarding, under any reasonable
definition of torture, is torture.
Torture is illegal, and given our country’s (historic) moral
stature,77 we have a “special responsibility” to enforce the
prohibition, as noted by the journalist Eyal Press.78 We lead by
example, and, without condemning torture ourselves, we cannot
expect others to do so.79 That condemnation must be more than
rhetorical. Insisting that the United States does not torture is
empty rhetoric if we make the claim while inflicting
waterboarding on suspects.
Equivocating on torture not only causes us to lose moral
standing on the international stage but also places our own
soldiers at risk. As Professor Philip B. Heymann points out, if we
approve torture in particular circumstances, other countries will
do the same.80 It was that concern that led us to accept Geneva
Convention prohibitions on torture, despite the cost of obtaining
information that “might save dozens of American lives.”81
III. YOO’S RECENT OP-ED
Yoo continues to view the Geneva Convention restrictions
and other limits on the president’s use of coercive techniques as
wrong-headed and dangerous.82 In his recent op-ed, Yoo laments
that President Obama will likely “declare terrorists to be
prisoners of war under the Geneva Convention,” whereas the
Bush Administration classified terrorists “like pirates, illegal
combatants who do not fight on behalf of a nation and refuse to
obey the laws of war.”83
Alan Clarke argues that the demonization of an enemy, and
the claim that some people are just “outside of the law,” are

77 Cf. Chemerinsky, supra note 7, at 11 (noting our country’s long history of
condemning torture).
78 Eyal Press, In Torture We Trust? in CIVIL LIBERTIES, supra note 1, at 228.
79 Id.
80 Philip B. Heymann, Torture Should Not Be Authorized in CIVIL LIBERTIES, supra
note 1, at 217; see also Chemerinsky, supra note 31.
81 Id. The notion that torture will save lives is a dubious proposition, moreover.
“Torture subjects typically know less than what we think we know, and often tell us what
we want to hear.” Margulies, supra note 29, at 34; see also Laurie Magid, Deceptive Police
Interrogation Practices: How Far is Too Far?, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1168, 1173 (2001) (“In
Brown [v. Mississippi, involving torture] and other early cases, the Court clearly believed
that innocent persons had been convicted, and that their confessions were unreliable”);; cf.
M. Katherine B. Darmer, Miranda Warnings, Torture, the Right to Counsel and the War
on Terror, 10 CHAP. L. REV. 631, 654 (2007) (noting that the criminal justice system has
taught us much “about the dangers and unfairness of coerced confessions”).
82 Yoo, supra note 20.
83 Id.
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elements of the creation of a torture culture.84 “We inhabit a
world of ‘us’ against ‘the evil doers’ which permits a torture
culture to take hold. Al-Qaeda becomes equated with pirates and
slave traders to be dealt with or extirpated at will.”85 And as
Eyal Press argues, torture is “a function not of brute sadism but
of the willingness to view one’s enemies as something less than
human.”86
Moreover, while some of those classified as “enemy
combatants” have in fact been terrorists, others have not been.87
In demonizing the enemy and acting as though we are justified in
treating such a class of persons as “outside the law,” we run the
grave risk that innocents will be victims, as they have been in
the past. As Clarke points out, “[e]xperts estimate that eighty
percent of people tortured by our forces and our South
Vietnamese allies during the Vietnam War were wholly innocent
people who were in the wrong place at the wrong time.”88
Clarke illustrates in his recent article, Creating a Torture
Culture, that the use of torture is not easily cabined.89 Rather:
Once started, torture and other abusive practices spread. Their logic
cannot be easily contained. If it is right to torture in the extreme
situation, what about a slightly less extreme case? . . . In every case,
harsh practices can be justified on the ground that the person being
questioned may harbor information that could save innocent lives.90

Relying on history and behavioral science studies, Clarke
also points out that torture is a “true slippery slope.”91 Most of us
are capable of torture and, “in the absence of enforced prevention
rules, systemic abuses become prevalent.”92
Even after Abu Ghraib and revelations about the extent to
which waterboarding was used,93 Yoo acknowledges no such risk
of systemic abuse, focusing instead only on the risk attendant to

Clarke, supra note 3, at 18.
Id.
Press, supra note 78, at 223–24; cf. generally Hernández-López, supra note 16, at
139–41 (pointing out European and Western structures’ tendency to see non-Westerns as
“‘others,’ savages, or barbarians” and how this tendency excludes non-Westerners).
87 See Chemerinsky, supra note 7, at 8 (noting mistakes made at Guantanamo Bay).
88 Clarke, supra note 3, at 24.
89 Id. at 21.
90 Id. See also Luban, supra note 3, at 1445–46 (noting that torture is not limited to
“one-off” decisions” and discussing the “normalization of torture”).
91 Clarke, supra note 3, at 13.
92 Id.
93 Regarding recent new information about the extent of the use of waterboarding
against two detainees, see note 53, supra.
84
85
86
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foregoing harsh interrogation tactics.94
With regard to
waterboarding specifically, Professor Yoo adheres steadfastly to
the view that it is a legitimate practice, acknowledging that
President Bush authorized the practice three times and
suggesting that President Obama acted precipitously and
foolishly in terminating the CIA’s “special authority to
interrogate terrorists.”95 Yet even before Obama’s inauguration,
the Department of Justice OLC had “conceded that
waterboarding [was] no longer legal” after the passage of the
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 and the Military Commissions
Act of 2006, albeit still claiming that the president could
authorize waterboarding and other such techniques “in special
circumstances.”96 In eschewing any authority for such practices,
the new president is doing nothing more than agreeing to follow
the law.
President Obama is also reclaiming some of the moral high
ground lost when it was revealed that the United States had
engaged in torture. While Yoo predicts that “Mr. Obama may
have opened the door to further terrorist acts on U.S. soil by
shattering some of the nation’s most critical defenses,”97 we can
hope that he has instead begun the laborious process of
reclaiming the country’s moral standing on the international
stage. As Washington Post columnist Richard Cohen wrote five
years ago in response to the BYTAP Memo:
The Bush administration constantly reminds us that there’s a
war on. That’s wrong. There are two. One is being fought by
soldiers in combat, and the other is being fought for the hearts
and minds of people who are not yet our enemies. However
badly the administration has botched the first war . . . it has
done even worse with the second. It has jutted its chin to the
world, appeared pugnacious and unilateralist, permitted the
abuse of POWs and others at Abu Ghraib, and now toyed in
some fashion with torture. The Bush administration has
shamed us all, reducing us to the level of those governments
that also have wonderful laws forbidding torture, but condone
it anyway.98

It is notable that Yoo’s opinion piece adhering to the view
that waterboarding is an indispensable tool in the War on Terror
was written more than eight years after the tragic events of 9/11;
94 Yoo, supra note 20. At the Chapman debate held April 21, 2009, at which time it
was known that waterboarding had been used against one detainee 183 times and against
another, 83 times, see note 53, supra, Yoo remained sanguine regarding its use.
95 Id.
96 Clarke, supra note 3, at 3.
97 Yoo, supra note 20.
98 Cohen, supra note 1, at 318–19.
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it was not written under the same pressures that Yoo and others
faced when they first advocated a narrow definition of “torture”
when advising the Administration.99 In other words, even after
considerable reflection and presumably after considering the
virtual cottage industry that has developed to criticize Yoo’s
wartime memos, Yoo remains strident in defense of his first
instincts.
CONCLUSION
Fortunately, the majority of academics and lawyers acted
quickly and decisively to illustrate the dangers of instincts that
would act to grab power and inflict torture in the name of making
us safer. Not only was the BYTAP Memo formally withdrawn by
the Justice Department, but it has been thoroughly
deconstructed and criticized by an army of academics.
In the opening quote of his piece, In Torture We Trust?, Eyal
Press quotes from John-Paul Sartre: “If patriotism has to
precipitate us into dishonour, if there is no precipice of
inhumanity over which nations and men will not throw
themselves, then, why in fact do we go to so much trouble to
become, or to remain, human?”100 Indeed.

99
100

Yoo, supra note 20.
Press, supra note 78, at 219.

